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This paper explores the trade-oﬀ between the short-term beneﬁts of
false quality advertisements against the longer term costs of reputation
damage. A directed search model is constructed in which submarkets
are created by the advertisements and reputations of sellers. A reputa-
tion system links misleading advertisements in the present period to a
lower reputation in the next period. We show that a reputation system
always increases the prices of high quality products and directs search
more accurately towards the sellers with such products. We also show
that buyers are hurt by a reputation system if the market is thin — has
few sellers — because the equilibrium increase in prices is greater than
the equilibrium increase in the quality of trade. Finally, we show that
a reputation system which screens for honesty increases social welfare
by making sellers more truthful. However, we also show that a repu-
tation for honesty is not always highly valued and that an alternative
reputation system which screens for type can be more eﬀective.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never
hurt me.
The pen is mightier than the sword.
A reputation system is a method of gathering and reporting information
about past transactions. On-line reputation systems include eBay, which
gathers customer reports about the behavior of traders in the auctions that
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1it hosts, and Epinions, which collects expert reviews. Many types of rep-
utation systems existed before the Internet. For example, credit and em-
ployment agencies are arguably reputation systems. However, these systems
also generally enforce explicit punishments and/or are used by the same peo-
ple that operate them. The experience of the Internet demonstrates that
successful business models simply aggregate information. This phenomenon
has come as something of a surprise. Old reputation systems, such as the
Better Business Bureau, once relied on public subsidies. Now these systems,
as evidenced by eBay, can operate at a proﬁt.
In this paper, we show that the theory of directed search (see, for exam-
ple, Moen 1997 and Julien, et al. 2000) can be used to explain the value of
diﬀerent reputation systems. A directed search equilibrium is one in which
decentralized sellers adopt selling mechanisms strategically in an eﬀort to
coordinate trade with buyers. Directed search models emphasize two factors
that are essential to modelling reputation systems: (i) infrequent interaction
of traders, and (ii) the creation of a set of submarkets by similarly posi-
tioned sellers. Infrequent interaction of traders is essential to explaining
why market coordination on the basis of past indiscretions is impossible
without a third-party reputation system. Submarket creation is essential to
understanding why a reputation system works.
In our model, a reputation system augments the creation of submarkets.
Submarkets are deﬁned not only by the advertisements of sellers but also by
their reputations. The reputation system links misleading advertisements
in the current period to lower reputations in the next period. Both sellers
and buyers are aware of this process and act strategically. In order to make
the model as simple as possible, we assume that sellers coordinate trade by
advertising a set of competing auctions (Wolinsky (1988), McAfee (1991),
Peters and Severinov (1997), Julien, et al. (2000, 2002a)). This assump-
tion is useful for our purposes, because it is the closest institutionally to
eBay, and makes the model easy to solve, because sellers simply direct the
search of buyers by ex ante product quality advertisements with prices being
determined ex post.1
We investigate the eﬀects of a reputation system on the payoﬀs of buyers.
We show that buyers’ payoﬀs either increase or decrease depending on the
number of sellers and the amount of information buyers obtain about their
quality. A reputation system hurts buyers if it forces them to compete too
intensely for high quality products. We ﬁnd that buyers are always hurt by
1A number of other authors assume search is directed by price posting, however, these
models are generally much more complicated to solve (see Peters (1984), Montgomery
(1991), Moen (1997), Julien, et al (2000), and Burdett, et al (2001)). An important
unifying result in this literature is the equivalence of auctions and posted prices when
sellers and buyers are homogeneous and markets are large (Kultti (1999) and Julien et al
(2002)). The existence of heterogenous valuations by buyers favours auctions (Kennes et
al (2001)).
2a reputation system if the market is suﬃciently thin, that is, it has relatively
few sellers compared to buyers. Buyers are also always hurt by a reputation
system if the creation of a low quality submarket is not so informative as to
warrant exclusion of these sellers. Therefore, small amounts of information
are always harmful to buyers. In a thick market, buyers are always beneﬁted
by a reputation system because the price increases for high quality products
are much smaller. Thick markets are also necessary for any seller to be
excluded, thus there is a close connection between our two results concerning
a reduction in the welfare of buyers.
We also investigate the eﬀects a reputation system has on overall welfare.
For many parameters the value added of a reputation system is small, in the
order of one or two percent of the volume of trade. Thus, if a company like
eBay oversees ten billion dollars in trade, the value added by the reputation
system of eBay is one hundred or two hundred million dollars. The poten-
tially small value added explains two things about this type of business.
First, the cost of collecting information must be extremely small if such a
business model is to be eﬀective. This fact may explain why such businesses
were not eﬀective prior to the Internet. The second fact is that the volume
o ft r a d em u s tb ee x t r e m e l yl a r g et op a yf o re v e nm o d e r a t eﬁxed costs. Thus
eBay could be described as a natural monopoly. We also parameter discuss
cases where the welfare beneﬁt of a reputation system is quite large in the
order of ﬁve or ten percent. Eﬀects of a reputation system on overall welfare
are large if many good and bad sellers coexist in the market and the product
quality of bad sellers is signiﬁcantly less than the product quality of good
sellers.
Finally, we investigate the eﬀects a reputation system has on sellers’
payoﬀs and behaviour. We consider two types of reputation systems for
two types of markets. First, if the product quality of the sellers does not
change over time, a sensible reputation system functions as a detector of low
quality and advertisements of low quality only serve to place a seller in a
low quality submarket. In this case, the reputation system raises welfare by
providing information about sellers, but it does not foster honesty. However,
if good sellers face stochastic product quality, an eﬀective reputation system
functions as a detector of honesty. A seller may then be able to signal type
by choosing to be honest in the event that product quality is low.
Our work is related to the economics of asymmetric information initiated
by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).2 In our
model, we extend this work by assuming that past indiscretions are revealed
to traders only by a reputation system. This assumption is contrasted by a
number of formal models of reputation that have the assumption of asym-
metric information (Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Diamond (1989)) but do
not address the problem of how information about indiscretions is gathered
2Other pioneering work in this area includes Stigler (1961) and Arrow (1963).
3and reported. Random matching models by Ellison (1994) and Tirole (1996)
address some of the issues related to our paper. However, these models do
not have reputationally driven submarkets and thus do not fully explain how
a reputation system coordinates trade.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give a prelim-
inary discussion of model. This section gives an illustrative example of the
model and some basic deﬁnitions of reputation systems and market struc-
tures without going into much formal detail about the nature of the players,
strategies and payoﬀs. In the subsequent sections, we describe the formal
model and then solve its equilibrium. In the ﬁnal two sections, we give some
directions for future research and our concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
To ﬁx ideas, this section ﬁrst gives a simple heuristic example of a market
in which the introduction of a reputation system changes the behaviour of
buyers and sellers. We then introduce formal deﬁnitions of two reputation
systems and of two market structures in which such reputation systems can
operate.
2.1 An illustrative example
Consider a large number of ‘pick your own’ orchards and a large number of
potential customers — fruit-eaters/pickers — who live in the city. The orchard
owners auction their fruit based on local market demand, that is, there is
competitive bidding. If they get many customers they get a high price, if
they get few or no customers, they get a low or zero price. The customers are
uncoordinated over which orchard they visit. Furthermore, the distances are
suﬃciently remote that they must choose only one orchard to visit.3 This
coordination problem yields a random number of customers at each orchard.
In the absence of any perceived diﬀerences in orchard quality, each orchard
owner earns equal expected proﬁts although there are diﬀerences in realized
proﬁt due to the coordination friction.
Now suppose that there is a quality diﬀerence between the orchards.
For example, suppose that half of the orchard owners are endowed with
ladders which make picking fruit easier and more enjoyable. If these orchard
owners advertise that they have ladders then they can create a submarket
in which more fruit-pickers are willing to enter. Customers would arrive at
the orchard and enjoy greater utility from picking and consequently pay a
higher price for the fruit, other things equal. Thus the high quality fruit
orchards (orchards with ladders) will obtain a higher probability of trade
and a higher price relative to those orchards without ladders. The problem
3Other models of spatially separated sellers include Phelps (1968) and Lucas (1973).
4is that orchard owners without ladders also wish to advertise easy pickings.
The reason is that if they do, they can enjoy the higher probability of trade
associated with such advertisements. Of course, they won’t get the greatest
possible price in the event of high demand since customers can determine
whether the orchard has ladders when they turn up and before they pay
for the fruit. However, they ensure that the high demand state is most
likely. Consequently, the decentralized outcome is for all orchard owners to
advertise that they have ladders.
Now suppose that a reputation system is introduced. This system mon-
itors customer reports from year to year. The reputation system compiles
a list of good quality orchards and a list of bad quality orchards based on
customer reports, or some other form of monitoring, from the previous year.
This system ensures that good quality orchards enjoy a higher probability of
trade in the following year, because they have now earned good reputations.
In other words, a reputation system fosters the creation of submarkets. No-
tice that the reputation system in this case does not foster honesty, that is,
all bad orchards continue to lie.
Can a reputation system encourage honesty? To answer this question,
we need to identify the factors that might lead the owner of an orchard
without ladders to be honest if there exists a reputation system. Suppose
that good orchards cannot ensure the availability of ladders. For example,
the orchard owner might have a ‘restricted use’ contract for ladders such
that they are unavailable if the precious grape harvest is under way. In
that case, the needs of grape growers take priority. The customers cannot
observe whether this event is true since grapes are harvested under great
secrecy. The question now to the owner of an orchard with this type of
contract is whether to be honest in the event that the ladders are in use in
the vineyard and so are unavailable in the orchard. If the orchard owners
are honest they can keep their good reputation and signal that they will
probably have ladders available next year. Alternatively, they could simply
advertise that they have ladders, enjoy the higher probability of trade in the
current period, and suﬀer the possible loss of reputation in the future.
2.2 Reputation systems and market structure
The orchard example and its permutations suggest that it is possible to
describe how a reputation system can change the strategic behaviour of
buyers and sellers. The purpose of this section is to provide some formal
deﬁnitions of reputation systems and to make some preliminary comments
about how market structures and reputation systems are related.
In many markets, the intrinsic qualities of sellers and their products do
not change over time. For example, some orchards might have beautiful
views while others might be located next to toxic waste dumps. In these
cases, a reputation system is useful only because it identiﬁes a seller’s type
5through the identiﬁcation of the quality of the product sold in the previous
period. Honesty is clearly not an important criteria for establishing a good
reputation in such cases. In particular, if the orchard owner is honest about
toxic waste in the present period, a sensible reputation system should not al-
locate the seller to a high quality submarket in the next period. More cogent
examples include human capital. A reputation system might observe that
someone is honest about being not intelligent this period, but that does not
imply that the reputation system should assign the seller a ‘good’ reputation
in the subsequent period. In such markets where quality is immutable, an
eﬀective reputation system screens for type:
Deﬁnition 1 Ar e p u t a t i o ns y s t e mscreens for type if advertisements in
the previous period are reported and ‘asterisks’ are assigned to those sellers
that reportedly lied about product quality.
This reputation system is complicated because it attempts to record and
report two types of information. The ﬁr s tt y p eo fi n f o r m a t i o ni sw h e t h e r
a seller is honest and the second type of information is whether the seller
achieved this reputation for honesty by selling low or high quality products
in the past. To get a good reputation the seller is graded on both measures.
This reputation system is eﬀective if product quality never changes, because
it rules out a strategy of bad sellers attempting to get a good reputation
simply by being honest
In many other markets, a good seller might often have high quality prod-
ucts for sale, but occasionally the seller gets a lemon that he wishes to un-
load. If good sellers have variable product quality, honesty is potentially
the most valued aspect of a reputation. A reputation system that screens
predominantly for honesty is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 Ar e p u t a t i o ns y s t e mscreens for honesty if sellers that re-
portedly lied about their product quality are assigned a bad reputation in the
subsequent period.
This type of reputation system has an number of important advantages
over the more complicated reputation system that screens for type. First, the
amount of information that is gathered and reported by a reputation system
that screens for type might be overwhelming. Second, the two measures of a
reputation will have to be aggregated by some meaningful algorithm. Third,
practical problems of such a system might occur if the product market falls
into a wide set of categories such that product qualities are hard to detect by
a third party who records the set of advertisements. A reputation system
that screens for honesty has none of these disadvantages. For example,
it seems reasonable to assume that buyers are generally expert enough to
ascertain quality, such that upon negotiating with the seller, the buyer can
report whether the seller misrepresented the quality of products for sale.
63 The model
A market is assumed to operate for two periods, denoted t =1 ,2. Let M
denote the set and the number of buyer and let N denote the set and the
number of sellers in the market.
3.1 Sellers and products





denote the set of product quality levels. A product of quality
q ≥ 0i so flow quality and a product of quality q>qis of high quality.
Each seller is one of two quality types: good or bad.L e t η denote the
f r a c t i o no fs e l l e r st h a ta r eo ft h eg o o dt y p ea n dl e t1−η denote the fraction
of sellers that are the bad type.
At the start of each period, each seller draws one product from a proba-
bility distribution deﬁned over Q. It is assumed that these distributions are
such that bad type sellers always have a low quality product for sale, while
good type sellers have a high quality product with some strictly positive
probability 0 < γ ≤ 1i ne a c hp e r i o d .W el e tb q ≡ γq +( 1− γ)q denote the
expected quality of a good type seller’s product. The average quality of the
products of all sellers is given by
e q ≡ ηb q +( 1− η)q.
In each period sellers advertise, possibly untruthfully, whether they have
a high quality or low quality product. All advertisements are seen by all
buyers. Following the advertisements, every seller sells their product using
an ascending bid auction. For simplicity, the reserve price at every auction
is assumed to be zero.
3.2 Buyers and bidding
Each buyer i ∈ M seeks to buy one unit of the product in each period.
Buyers are identical in their willingness to pay for quality. In particular, the
net utility function of buyers over all price-quality outcomes of bidding at
an auction of seller j in period t is given by
ui (qjt,p ijt)=
½
qjt − pijt if pijt is the winning bid
0o t h e r w i s e
,
where qjt is the quality of product of seller j and pijt is the bid of buyer i
at seller j’s auction.
A buyer can purchase the product only by going to a seller’s location
and participating in that seller’s auction. Upon visiting the seller, the buyer
becomes perfectly informed of the good’s quality, before bidding commences.
The bidding at seller j’s auction depends on the number of buyers visiting
7seller j. Under an ascending bid auction, if mjt is the number of buyers





0i f mjt =1
qjt if mjt > 1
.
Thus, a seller receives a non-zero price for his or her product if and only if
more than one buyer turns up to the auction.
3.3 Frictional assignment with submarkets
A search friction exists in each period because buyers are uncoordinated and
can choose to visit the location of only one seller. This location decision is
interpreted broadly as representing the buyer’s maximum sphere of attention
in the period.4 We also assume that buyers never purchase from the same
seller twice, that is, we rule out long-term relationships by assumption.
The search of each buyer is directed by a common set of submarkets,
which are created by the advertisements and reputations of sellers. In the
absence of a reputation system, sellers are only distinguished by their ad-
vertisements, and hence a submarket consists of sellers who are advertising
the same quality level. Thus, without a reputation system, there are up to
two diﬀerent submarkets in each period, consisting of sellers who advertise
high and low quality. With a reputation system, there are also up to two
submarkets in the ﬁrst period as sellers do not have reputations in the ﬁrst
period. However in the second period there can be up to four submarkets,
since sellers are now distinguished by both advertisements (high quality and
low quality) and by two reputations (good and bad). However, in the sec-
ond period, because the game ends, we will show in proposition 2 below that
sellers’ advertisements will convey no useful information to buyers. Thus in
the second period, sellers are only distinguished by their reputations.
Let Φ ≡ M/N denote market tightness, that is, the buyer-seller ratio
for the whole market and let φ denote the market tightness of a particular
submarket. We use φ1
l and φ1
h to denote the measures of market tightness
in the ﬁrst-period submarkets deﬁned by sellers who advertise low and high
quality respectively. Similarly, we use φ2
l and φ2
h to denote the market
tightnesses in the second-period submarkets deﬁned by sellers who have bad
and good reputations respectively. At this point, readers who are unfamilar
with the directed search literature are referred to our appendix, in which we
describe the matching process and derive some important functional forms.
Wolinsky (1988) shows (also in our appendix) that the probability dis-
tribution that b buyers turn up to a seller’s auction in a (sub)market with
4Lucas (1973) suggests that models of trade between the inhabitants of ‘islands’ capture
essential economic frictions that extend well beyond their ‘nautical interpretation’.





e−φ for b =0
φe−φ for b =1
1 − e−φ − φe−φ for b>1
.
The most important of these probabilities for the seller is that for b>1,
since only in this case does the seller receives a non-zero price from his or
her auction. Accordingly, we deﬁne the function p(φ)=1− e−φ − φe−φ.
The expected proﬁt of a seller with product quality qj in a submarket of
tightness φ is then given by
Vj = p(φ)qj.( 1 )
From a buyer’s point of view, what matters is whether or not they are
alone at a seller’s auction, since if they are alone they will get a strictly
positive surplus from the auction while if they are not alone their surplus
will be zero. The probability that a buyer is alone at any given seller in a
submarket with market tightness φ is given by e−φ, while the probability a
buyer is not alone at a seller is given by 1 − e−φ. The expected utility of a
representative buyer i of visiting a seller in a submarket with tightness φ is
given by
Ui = e−φqz,( 2 )
where qz is the average quality of sellers’ products in this submarket.
Buyers are uncoordinated over which seller to visit in each submarket.
Therefore, the total number of x sellers obtaining at least one bidder in














where αt is the fraction of sellers that are in the high quality submarket - see
the appendix for the derivation of this function.5 This matching function
has all the usual properties commonly assumed about matching functions,
including constant returns to scale, diﬀerentiability and concavity.
3.4 The reputation system
At the end of the ﬁrst period, the reputation system collects information
on seller behaviour and assigns reputations to sellers according to the ap-
propriate algorithm. At the beginning of the second period, buyers observe
sellers’ reputations, as well as their new advertisements, before choosing
which seller’s auction to visit.
5Butters (1977) ﬁrst derives this matching technology.
9We model the reputation system by introducing a parameter k ∈ [0,1]
that represents the probability that a seller who is dishonest in period 1 is
‘caught’ and is assigned a bad reputation in the second period. For simplicity
it will be assumed that all sellers who are not caught get a good reputation
and thus cannot be distinguished by buyers from sellers who were honest.
If the reputation system is based on monitoring by the system operator
itself, the value of k reﬂects the eﬀectiveness of this monitoring and is taken
as given. If reputations are assigned on the basis of buyer reports, as occurs
on eBay, then k becomes endogenous. Under such a system we assume that
the winning bidder at every auction submits a report as to whether the seller
told the truth or not, and that all buyers are honest in their reports. Under
such a ‘customer-report reputation system’, the value of k is endogenous,
and is equal to the probability that at least one buyer turns up to a seller’s
a u c t i o ni nt h eﬁrst-period submarket of sellers who advertise high quality.
3.5 The timing of the reputation system game
The timing of the game with a reputation system is summarized in ﬁgure 1.
At the start of period 1, each seller observes their type (good or bad) and
their product quality (high or low). They then choose to advertise either
high or low product quality. Buyers observe the sellers’ advertisements and
choose one seller to visit. Frictional assignment implies that buyers in any
particular submarket of similarly advertised sellers are randomly assigned
to the sellers. After this assignment, buyers bid on the seller’s product and
the good is sold to the highest bidder. At the start of period 2, a reputation
system assigns a reputation to each seller based on events in the previous pe-
riod and the properties of the reputation system under investigation. Sellers
draw a new product according to their type. Buyers choose a reputational
submarket and are frictionally assigned to a seller in this submarket. Bid-
ding then takes place, the good is sold to the highest bidder, and ﬁnally the
game ends.
4 Directed search and quality diﬀerentiated sub-
markets
In this section, we ﬁrst derive the equilibrium ‘reaction functions’ of buyers
to any arbitrary partition of sellers into two quality diﬀerentiated submar-
kets. We then consider the eﬀect on buyers’ welfare of any partition of sellers
into two quality diﬀerentiated submarkets and the eﬀect on overall welfare
of any such partition.
Each period has either (i) two submarkets or (ii) a single market in which
all buyers are randomly assigned to all sellers. The expected payoﬀ of any
10Figure 1: Timing of the reputation game.
given buyer in this case is
UNR ≡ e qe−Φ,
where time superscripts are dropped for notational convenience from here
on whereever possible.
Suppose now that sellers are allocated by some mechanism into two
quality diﬀerentiated submarkets. Let ql and qh denote the expected quality
levels of sellers in the two submarkets, and let α denote the fraction of sellers
that are allocated to the submarket with expected quality qh. Without loss
of generality we assume qh >q l. If sellers are allocated into two quality
diﬀerentiated submarkets, the average quality of sellers across submarkets
cannot change, thus
e q = αqh +( 1− α)ql.( 3 )
Also, the number of buyers is ﬁxed, and so market tightness for each sub-
market is related to overall market tightness as follows:
Φ = αφh +( 1− α)φl,( 4 )
where φl and φh denote the buyer-seller ratios of the two submarkets.
The division of sellers into submarkets leads to two basic types of equi-
librium allocations of buyers. These allocations depend upon the average
quality of sellers in each submarket, their relative numbers, and the overall
ratio of buyers to sellers. These conditions are summarized by what we call
the exclusion constraint:
qhe−Φ/α ≥ ql.( E C )
The left hand side of the exclusion constraint is the expected utility of buyers
if all buyers locate in the high quality submarket. The right hand side of
11this constraint is the average quality of sellers products in the low quality
submarket. If the partition of sellers into submarkets satisﬁes the exclusion
constraint, all buyers locate in the high quality submarket. Therefore, if EC
is satisﬁed,
φh = Φ/α and φl =0 . ( 5 )
A partition of sellers into the low submarket which satisﬁes EC is the
maximum punishment a reputation system can impose on these sellers. In
this case, sellers in the low quality submarket are not allocated any buyers.
If the partition of sellers into submarkets does not satisfy EC, buyers locate
in both the high quality and low quality submarkets. Therefore, in a mixed
strategy equilibrium where EC is not satisﬁed, we must have
qhe−φh = qle−φl.( 6 )
In this case, buyers locate in both the high quality and low quality submar-
kets such that expected utility to buyers is the same in each submarket.
The behavior of buyers can be expressed as a function of the distribution
of sellers across each submarket. This function depends crucially on EC.




Φ +( 1− α)ln(qh/ql)o t h e r w i s e
. (7)
Similarly, market tightness in the low submarket is given by
φl =
½
0i f E C
Φ − αln(qh/ql)o t h e r w i s e
(8)
Table 1 gives some numerical examples of the equilibrium market tight-
ness in each submarket for diﬀerent partitions of sellers. This example il-
lustrates that the exclusion constraint is satisﬁed if the market is thick — a
small Φ such that there are many sellers — or if the diﬀerence in the average
quality of the sellers in the two submarkets is large. In these cases, low qual-
ity sellers receive the maximum punishment of a reputation system and are
excluded from the market. This example also shows that, for a large number
of parameters, the partition of sellers into quality diﬀerentiated submarkets
is not so informative as to exclude sellers in the low quality submarket.
If EC holds, sellers in the low quality submarket are excluded, and from
(2), a buyer’s utility in any period is simply U = e−Φ/αqh.I fE Cd o e sn o t
hold, buyers visit both submarkets with strictly positive probability. From
(2) and (6), a buyer’s utility in any period is U = e−φhqh. Substituting in
(7), we obtain U = e−Φqα
hq1−α
l . Summarising, for any distribution of sellers
across submarkets, the expected payoﬀ of a buyer, U in the period under


































Table 1: Numerical examples of equilibrium market tightnesses








The utility of buyers is a linear function of the average quality of sellers
in the high submarket if sellers in the low submarket are excluded. If no
sellers are excluded, the utility of buyers is a Cobb-Douglas function of the
average quality of the sellers’ products in each submarket with the weights
being the fraction of sel l e r si ne a c hs u b m a r k e t .
Theorem 1 A partition of sellers into two quality diﬀerentiated submarkets
deceases the welfare of buyers if (i) the partition does not satisfy EC or (ii)
the market is suﬃciently ‘thin’. The welfare of buyers increases otherwise.
Proof. If not EC,
U − UNR = e−Φqα
hq1−α




l − (αqh +( 1− α)ql)
¤
< 0f o ra l lqh 6= ql and α ∈ (0,1).
To see the inequality, note that in general, xαy1−α < αx +( 1− α)y for




αlogx+(1− α)logy<log(αx +( 1− α)y) since log is a concave function,
and log monotone implies xαy1−α < αx +( 1− α)y.
If EC,
U − UNR = e−Φ/αqh − e−Φe q
< 0i f Φ > [α/(1 − α)]ln(qh/e q)
> 0 otherwise.
A reputation system hurts buyers if it forces them to compete more
intensely for high quality products. Theorem 1 demonstrates that buyers
13are always hurt by a reputation system if the creation of the low quality
submarket is not so informative as to warrant exclusion of these sellers. In
the case where low quality sellers are excluded, theorem 1 demonstrates that
buyers are always hurt by a reputation system if the market is suﬃciently
thin — if it has only a few sellers. In both cases, buyers are hurt because they
pay much higher prices in equilibrium even though they obtain high quality
products with greater frequency. In a thick market, buyers are beneﬁted by
the reputation system because the associated price increases for high quality
products are much smaller.
The decentralized actions of buyers in response to the information sup-
plied by the creation of submarkets raises a question over whether submarket
creation is socially eﬃcient. For example, if EC is satisﬁed, then there is
increased competition between buyers for the remaining high quality sellers.
Likewise, if low quality sellers are included, then it is not clear that too
many buyers will locate in this submarket. However, it is possible to show
that the creation of submarkets always raises social welfare. If there is only





where e q is the average quality of sellers products and N(1 − e−Φ)i st h e
total number of trades between sellers and buyers in this purely random

















The welfare in a period with submarkets can be directed compared to welfare
without submarkets.
Theorem 2 A partition of sellers into two quality diﬀerentiated submarkets
always increases social welfare.
Proof. If not EC,



















by eqs (3), (7) and (8)
> 0 for all qh 6= ql and α ∈ (0,1).
If EC,








14Note that W −WNR is strictly decreasing in ql, hence the worst case is when
ql is as large as possible that satisﬁes EC, that is when ql = qhe−Φ/α.T h u s
we only need to show that W − WNR ≥ 0f o rE Cs a t i s ﬁed with equality. In
this case,











αe−Φ − e−Φ/α +( 1− α)e−Φ1+α
α
i
The term in the square brackets can be written as
e−Φ1+α






This is positive since e−Φ1+α
α >e −Φ
α and α < αeΦ1−α
α for all Φ > 0a n d
α ∈ (0,1).
Welfare is improved by submarket creation because buyers’ search is
directed more accurately and thus the number of quality adjusted matches
increases.
5 Strategic equilibrium and reputation systems
In the previous section, we considered the eﬀects on buyers and welfare of
an arbitrary separation of sellers into quality diﬀerentiated submarkets in
the general case, without saying what creates or maintains the separation
of sellers. In this section we consider strategic behaviour of sellers in the
presence of a reputation system and show how this can lead to the creation,
in equilibrium, of quality diﬀerentiated submarkets. In particular, we derive
the equilibrium strategies of sellers given the ‘reaction functions’ of buyers
that were derived in the previous section. We investigate the equilibrium
predictions of the model with and without a reputation system. We ﬁrst
consider the case where good sellers always have high quality products and
the reputation system screens for type. We then consider the case where
good sellers sometimes have low quality products and the reputation system
screens for honesty. Finally, we compare the equilibria for the two types of
reputation system when good sellers always have high quality products.
5.1 Behaviour of sellers without a reputation system
In the absence of a reputation system, there is nothing to link the two
periods for either buyers of sellers, and we can thus treat the two periods as
independent. In this case, it is straightforward to see the following result.
Proposition 1 In the absence of a reputation system, a seller’s equilib-
rium advertisement carries no information to buyers about the quality of
the seller’s product.
15Proof. Suppose to the contrary that sellers’ advertisements were in-
formative. Then by deﬁnition there would exist two quality diﬀerentiated
submarkets. Since by (6) there is a higher buyer-seller ratio in a submarket
with higher expcted quality, and since by (1) a seller’s expected utility is
strictly increasing in the buyer-seller ratio, all sellers would instead choose
their advertisement so as to locate in the higher quality submarket, a con-
tradiction.
In practical terms, proposition 1 implies that there are three possible
equilibria in each period without a reputation system: all sellers advertise
high quality; all sellers advertise low quality; or sellers randomise over ad-
vertising high and low quality such that there are two submarkets having
identical expected qualities. All of these three cases are essentially identi-
cal, and in particular all will have the same levels of welfare and payoﬀst o
buyers and sellers. Accordingly, for the purposes of our exposition, we shall
maintain that all sellers advertise high quality in the absence of a reputation
system.
Without a reputation system, the expected payoﬀs to good and bad
sellers in each period are respectively given by
V
g






NR, because b q>q .
5.2 Second period behavior of sellers
Since our model has only two periods, there is nothing to link the actions of
sellers in the second period with any future payoﬀ. It is therefore straight-
forward to see that sellers’ advertisements will not convey any information
to buyers in the second period, even in the presence of a reputation system.
Proposition 2 With a reputation system, sellers’ second-period equilibrium
advertisements carry no information to buyers.
Proof. Similar to the proof of proposition 1 except that in the second pe-
riod with a reputation system, quality diﬀerentiated submarkets deﬁned by
reputations may exist. Advertisements, however, cannot create additional
quality diﬀerentiated submarkets by the same argument as in the proof of
proposition 1.
As in the case without a reputation system, for the purposes of exposition
we will maintain that all sellers advertise high quality in the second period.
The key implication of proposition 2 is that sellers in the second period
are distinguished to buyers only by their reputation. That is, there are at
most two submarkets in the second period, one with sellers who have good
reputations, and one with sellers who have bad reputations. Since sellers
16do not yet have reputations in the ﬁrst period, there is also a maximum of
two submarkets in the ﬁrst period. Thus theorems 1 and 2 are suﬃciently
general to apply to every possible equilibrium of our model.
5.3 Reputations for type
In many markets, the intrinsic qualities of sellers and their products do not
change over time. For example, some orchards might have beautiful views
while others are next to toxic waste dumps. In these cases, a reputation
system is useful only because it identiﬁes a seller’s type by identifying the
quality of the product sold in the previous period. Honesty is clearly not an
important criteria for establishing a good reputation in such cases. We can
analyse this type of market using our model by assuming that sellers are
immutable in type and product (ITP). In this case, we assume that good
sellers always have quality products, that is, that γ =1 .
Given the second period behaviour implied by proposition 2, the equi-
librium when γ = 1 is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under a reputation system that screens for type, if all good
sellers have high quality products and all bad sellers have low quality prod-
ucts, all sellers advertise high quality in the ﬁrst period.
Proof. All good sellers have a dominant strategy of advertising high
quality in the ﬁrst period, because this strategy always places them in the
high submarket each period. A bad seller also advertises good quality in the
ﬁrst period, because this strategy places the seller in the high submarket
in period one and in the low submarket with only some probability next
period. The alternative strategy of honesty by a bad seller is dominated
because a bad seller is placed in the low quality submarket both periods if
he or she is honest in the ﬁrst period.
In this equilibrium, in the ﬁrst period, there is only one ‘submarket’,
since all sellers are apparently identical from a buyer’s point of view. The
ﬁrst period payoﬀ to a buyer is UNR, to a good seller is V
g
NR,t oab a ds e l l e r
is V b
NR and the contribution to social welfare is WNR.
All good type sellers will have a good reputation in the second period,
while some bad sellers will have a bad reputation and some will have a good
reputation, depending on the value of k. Note that under a customer report
system, k =1− e−Φ.6
6To benchmark the eﬃciency of a customer report reputation system in this case,
suppose that Φ = 1. Then the probability that at least one buyer turns up to a seller’s
auction in the ﬁrst period is 1 − e
−1 =0 .63. Thus when good type sellers always have a
high quality product for sale, approximately 63% of bad type sellers are ‘caught’ under a
customer report system when the overall ratio of buyers to sellers is one to one.
17With a reputation system and γ = 1, the distribution of sellers and their
average product quality in each of the second period submarkets is given by
qh =
ηq +( 1− k)(1− η)q
η +( 1− k)(1− η)
ql = q,
and
α = η +( 1− k)(1− η).
From these equations we can use the reaction functions of buyers described
in the previous section to compute the equilibrium values of φh and φl.T h e
sellers’ payoﬀs in the second period are given by
Vg = p(φh)q
and
Vb =( ( 1− k)p(φh)+kp(φl))q.
Payoﬀs of buyers and total welfare are given by (9) and (10) respectively.
To illustrate the eﬀects of a reputation system that screens for type on
the welfare of agents for diﬀerent measures of market tightness, consider the
following numerical example. Suppose that q =1a n dq = 1
2 and that the
reputation system is based on customer reports. Figure 2 depicts the eﬀects
of a reputation system that screens for type on (i) the welfare of buyers,
(ii) the welfare of good sellers, (iii) the welfare of bad sellers and (iv) total
welfare for diﬀerent market tightness conditions. From ﬁgure 2, as would
be expected, we can see that a reputation system only has value if there
exist both types of sellers. That is, the value of a reputation system that
screens for type is zero if η =0o rη = 1. We can also see that the results of
t h e o r e m s1a n d2a r ec o n ﬁrmed for these parameters.
5.4 Reputations for honesty
In this section, we analyse how a reputation system that screens for honesty
can foster equilibrium signalling by good sellers who occasionally have low
quality products. This type of market follows from our earlier discussion
of an orchard in which the supply of ladders is stochastic. In this case,
we assume that 0 < γ < 1. That is, good type sellers do not have a
high quality product with certainty in each period, although their expected
product quality, b q, is always strictly greater than that of a bad type seller.
Given this assumption we can investigate the strategy of sellers which we call
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Figure 2: Eﬀects of a reputation that screens for type when type is im-
mutable. Parameter values: q =1 ,q = 1
2, customer report system.
‘being honest’. To keep the analysis of this strategy as simple as possible,
we assume that the reputation system screens for honesty (see deﬁnition 2).
A seller who is honest truthfully advertises their product quality in pe-
riod 1. Note that by proposition 2, all sellers will advertise high quality in
the second period, thus in the second period the only thing that distinguishes
sellers from a buyer’s point of view is their reputation.
For obvious reasons, a good seller with a high quality product realization
will always advertise high quality and thus always tells the truth. Therefore
we only need to solve the decision problems for the bad type sellers and
the good type sellers with a low quality realization in period 1. We allow
for symmetric mixed strategies by sellers and we let ξb and ξg respectively
denote the probabilities that a bad seller and a good seller with a low quality
realization are honest in period 1.
T h en i n ed i ﬀerent conﬁgurations that the equilibrium can take are char-
a c t e r i z e di nt a b l e2 .W ed e ﬁne the ‘honesty valuation’, θg, of a good seller
with a bad realization to be the diﬀerence between the expected payoﬀ to

































19Case Behaviour of sellers with low quality products θg θb
1 All good sellers are honest, all bad sellers lie. + −
2 All good sellers are honest, some bad sellers honest. + 0
3 Some good sellers are honest, all bad sellers lie. 0 −
4 All sellers lie. − −
5 All sellers are honest. + +
6* All good sellers lie, all bad sellers are honest. − +
7* Some good sellers and all bad sellers are honest. 0 +
8* All good sellers lie, some bad sellers are honest. − 0
9* Some good and bad sellers are honest. 0 0
Table 2: Relationship between ‘honesty valuation’ and signalling equilib-





















































Proposition 4 The only possible equilibria are cases 1 — 5.
Proof. Since b q>q , from (11) and (12), θg > θb. That is, the ‘honesty
valuation’ of a good seller with a bad realization in period 1 is always greater
than that of a bad seller. This fact allows us to rule out all of cases 6 — 9
since an equilibrium in any of these cases requires θb ≥ θg.
We are left with cases 1 to 5 to consider. In each of the cases, we
used a numerical algorithm programmed in Matlab to test which type(s) of
equilibrium occurred for any given parameter values. To see how this works,
let us consider case 1 as an example. Case 1 is a pure strategy separating
equilibrium in which all good sellers are honest and all bad sellers lie.
In this case, in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dw eh a v e
α1 = γη +( 1− η),
q1
h =
γηq +( 1− η)q





20From (5), if the EC holds, we have φ1
l =0a n dφ1
h = Φ/α1 while if EC
does not hold from (6) we have φ1
















In the second period, we have
α2 = η +( 1− k)(1− η),
q2
h =
ηb q +( 1− k)(1− η)q













h for a given set of pa-
rameters, we then substitute these into the expressions for θg and θb.I f
θg > 0a n dθb < 0, we conclude that an equilibrium of this type exists for
the parameter values given.
The solution method for cases 2 — 5 is similar, hence we do not give all
the details here. The only diﬀerences being in the speciﬁcation of the values
of α, ql and qh in each period, and the conditions on θg and θb that must be
satisﬁed.
As a benchmark, we chose parameter values M = N = 1 (and hence
Φ =1 ) ,q =1 ,a n dq =0 .5. Figure 3 shows the existence of the 5 diﬀerent
possible types of equilibria varying η (the proportion of good type sellers in
the population) on the horizontal axis and γ (the probability that a good
type seller has a high quality product) on the vertical axis, for a reputation
system based on customer reports.
From ﬁgure 3, we ﬁrst notice that for these parameter values, there
is never an equilibrium in which all sellers are honest (case 5). This is a
feature of the results from many diﬀerent sets of parameters that we have
tried. From ﬁgure 3 we can also see that for some parameter values there
are multiple equilibria. Accordingly, ﬁgure 4 shows the equilibrium at each
point that gives the highest overall social welfare out of all the possible
equilibria at that point.
We can see from ﬁgures 3 and 4 that good sellers with bad products are
encouraged to be honest if there are few good sellers in the population or if
the probability that a good seller obtains a bad product is suﬃciently small.
Figure 5 shows the eﬀects on total welfare and the welfare of buyers and
sellers of introducing a reputation system that screens for honesty. For pa-
rameter cases where there are multiple equilibria under a reputation system,
the equilibrium with the highest overall welfare was chosen, corresponding

























Figure 3: Regions where the diﬀerent types of signaling equilibria exist. In
all cases η is on the horizontal axis and γ is on the vertical axis.
to the equilibrium shown in ﬁgure 4. Hence ﬁgure 5 gives an upper bound
on the welfare eﬀects of introducing a reputation system that screens for
honesty, for these parameter values.
5.5 Comparing reputation systems
We argued earlier in the preliminaries that a reputation that screens for
honesty might not be the most eﬀective reputation system if good sellers oﬀer
nice views and bad sellers have toxic waste dumps — i.e. product qualities
are invariant over time. The problem with a reputation system that screens
for honesty in this case is that a strategy of ‘honesty’ by a bad seller gives
that seller a good reputation in the second period. This strategy has a high
payoﬀ in the second period if buyer search is higly directed towards sellers
in the second period with high quality reputations.
Accordingly, ﬁgure 6 shows the diﬀerence in welfare eﬀects of a reputa-
tion system that screens for honesty and a reputation system that screens
for type, when type is immutable (i.e., γ =1 ) .T h eﬁgure shows the eﬀect
of a reputation system that screens for honesty less the eﬀect of one that
screens for type. We can see that the increase in total welfare of a reputation
system that screens for honesty is always less than or equal to the simpler
system that screens for type. On the other hand, buyers and bad sellers

















Figure 4: The equilibrium with the honest welfare level out of all the sig-
naling cases.
are made (weakly) better oﬀ by the honesty reputation system, while good
sellers are made worse oﬀ.
This simple comparison oﬀers only an upper bound on the extent to
which the two types of reputation systems have diﬀerent welfare eﬀects. A
more general comparison requires a solution to the equilibrium in which
a reputation system screens for type and good sellers sometimes have bad
products. This analysis lies slightly outside the scope of the present paper,
because the analysis would have to incorporate buyer reaction functions for
markets with more than two submarkets. We will develop this extension in
f u t u r ea n a l y s i sw h e r ew ei n t e n dt og i v eam o r ec o m p r e h e n s i v ea n a l y s i so f
alternative reputation systems.
6 Future Research
The present paper represents a ﬁrst attempt to model reputation systems
in a directed search equilibrium. As such, we have chosen to focus on a very
simple two period model with competing auctions, homogeneous buyers and
two types of sellers all separated by location. The purpose of this section is
to brieﬂy outline a set of possible directions for future research.
Loyalty. Long-term relationships are a potential substitute for a repu-
tation system. In particular, long-term relationships internalise the returns
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of a reputation system that screens for honesty when γ = 1
2.
to any information that is gathered by sellers and buyers from past trans-
actions. Long-term relationships of endogenous duration are analysed by
Julien, Kennes and King (2001) in a directed search model with on-the-job
search. It would be interesting to see how the introduction of a reputation
system changes (i) the duration of these long-term buyer-seller relationships
and (ii) the price (wage) proﬁles of agents in such relationships.
Parasitic customers. We have assumed that all buyers are sincere in their
eﬀorts to buy high quality products. This assumption begs the question as to
what would happen if some buyers were not sincere. An interesting extension
of the model would include buyers who act as parasites by threatening sellers
with bad reports. It would then be interesting to analyse a reputation system
that reports information about buyers in addition to sellers. In particular,
the opinions of chronic complainers might be weighed less than the opinions
of other buyers.
Endogenous selling mechanisms. In many frictional markets, the valua-
tions of buyers are idiosyncratic over locations. For example, in Jovanovic
(1979), the valuations of buyers over locations are homogeneous ex ante but
heterogeneous ex post. Auctions are extremely eﬀective in such markets, be-
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Figure 6: A comparison of the changes brought about by a reputation sys-
tems that screen for honesty and for type when γ =1 .
cause the auctions ensure all viable trades are executed.7 Posted prices are
disadvantaged in this setting because low quality trades are ruled out owing
to the commitment to the price posted. However, there is a potential trade-
oﬀ if reputations for quality are important. In particular, a commitment to
a high posted price is a potential signal of quality because low quality trades
are ruled out by the commitment to the price posted. That is to say, price
signals quality. Given this trade-oﬀ, it would be interesting to see how a
reputation system aﬀects the choice of whether to auction or post a price.8
Middlemen. Another strategy of sellers is the sale of multiple goods at
a location. The cost of maintaining large stocks by middlemen are asso-
ciated with diseconomies of scale concerning the application of specialized
knowledge and economies of scale associated with ‘one-stop shopping’ (ref:
Alchian 1977). It would be interesting to see how a reputation system af-
fects the number of products oﬀered by each seller and whether a reputation
7Wolinsky (1988) allows for this type of ex post uncertainty in his model of competing
auctions.
8Coles and Eeckhout (2000) discuss a broader set of alternative selling mechanisms.
25system aﬀects the creation of dealer networks, i.e. middlemen.
Alternative Reputation Systems. Although we have used two types of
reputation systems in our analysis, we have chosen not to devote much
attention to a comparison of these systems in the present paper. Instead,
we have used a reputation that screens for type if good sellers always have
high quality products and a reputation that screens for honesty if good
sellers sometimes have low quality products. These choices allowed us to
maintain a very simple analysis in which there always exists a maximum of
two possible reputational submarkets. In future work, we expect to do a
more systematic comparison of diﬀerent types of reputation systems. It will
be interesting to determine whether a reputation system that screens for
honesty is a close substitute for a reputation system that screens for type.9
Fees and subsidies. In our model, we have assumed that the reputation
system is exogenous and that no fees are required for its operation. The
introduction of a fee structure for a reputation system that governs a market
with diverse products raises a number of questions about the types of fees
that can be charged. Should fees be charged to both sellers and buyers?
Should selling fees be related to reputation? Are subsidies required to pay
for buyers’ reports?
Platform competition. The collection of fees by a reputation system
raises questions about the viability of competing reputation systems. What
are the advantages of the incumbent over the entrant. Is entry by a compet-
ing reputation system ever feasible? Should an industry with commercial
reputation systems be regulated?
Experiments. The endogenous frictions described in this paper could
easily be recreated in a laboratory. It would be interesting to develop a set
of experiments that would translate the present framework into a reputation
system “wind tunnel”. Experimental testing could aid the design and un-
derstanding of reputation systems. In particular, our understanding of the
eﬀects of diﬀerent reputation systems would be beneﬁted by analysing the
behaviour of real life players instead of the idealized agents which typically
populate economic models.
7 Conclusion
Search models emphasize the value of time by assuming that buyers are
restricted in the number of locations they can visit in a period. The impli-
cation of these models is that buyers economize on time when they search
for new purchases. In this paper, we assumed that sellers are aware of these
objectives and act strategically. The equilibrium strategic behaviour of sell-
ers in a directed search model with asymmetric information about product
9Dellarocas (2002) oﬀers a helpful survey of alternative online reputation systems/
mechanisms.
26quality is to oversell product quality in order to maximize the probability
of trade. Thus a seller with a low quality car advertises high quality. A
reputation system imposes a punishment on these excessive advertisements.
We showed that this punishment encourages honesty and reveals deception.
We also showed that both of these factors add value to a reputation system.
The simplicity and, hopefully, transparency of our model of a reputation
system is aided by parallel developments in the theory of directed search
(Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) and Julien, Kennes and King (2000)). Our
particular version of a directed search model assumes decentralised compet-
ing auctions — an assumption that is quite close to the actual institutional
structure of eBay. The main innovation of our model is to show how search
is directed by a set of reputationally enhanced submarkets and to describe
how such markets are created by a reputation system. The creation of these
submarkets is a dynamic process in which misleading advertisements in one
period lead to lower reputations in the next period.
Our model demonstrates that a reputation system increases not only the
probability that a buyer ﬁnds high quality products, but also the equilibrium
price of such products. Consequently, the eﬀect of a reputation system on
the welfare of buyers is ambiguous. We gave two conditions in which buyers
are made worse oﬀ by a reputation system. First, we showed that buyers
are made worse oﬀ by a reputation system in a thin market (few sellers),
because prices then rise disproportionately more than the quality of products
traded. Second, we showed that buyer welfare is a function of the amount
of information provided by a reputation system for any number of sellers.
In particular, if the amount of extra information supplied by a reputation
system is suﬃciently small such that no sellers are excluded from the market,
buyers are always made worse oﬀ.
The simplicity of our framework suggests that it should be possible to
extend it in a number of diﬀerent directions. For example, it would be
interesting to see how a reputation system aﬀects customer loyalty, reports
by chronic complainers, and the choice of selling mechanisms by competing
sellers. It would also be interesting to look more deeply into the design,
operation and regulation of a reputation system. These investigations would
include the design of fee and subsidies structures, a detailed comparison of
alternative types of reputation systems, the role of competition between the
operators of rival reputation systems, and the possible beneﬁts of regulation.
Experimental research could also prove useful in this context. All of these
topics await further research.
8 Appendix
Frictional assignment is the outcome of buyers being uncoordinated over
which seller to visit in each submarket. An equilibrium with frictional as-
27signment is a mixed strategy equilibrium in the location of buyers over sellers
(ref: Julien, Kennes and King 2000 and Burdett, Shi and Wright 2001). A








j is the probability that buyer i visits seller j’s auction. We will
focus on symmetric equilibria in which σi = σj for all i 6= j =1 ,2,...,M.
Suppose that the sellers are divided into an arbitrary number of mutually ex-
clusive and completely exhaustive groups G ∈ [2,N]a c c o r d i n gt os o m ec h a r -
acteristic(s). Let Ng denote the number of sellers in group g =1 ,2,...,G
and note that
PG
g=1 Ng = N. Assume that the payoﬀ to a buyer of winning
a seller’s auction is the same for every seller within a given group and denote
this payoﬀ by ug.
Without loss of generality we can decompose the buyers’ decision into
a two-step process by which they ﬁrst choose the group of sellers to visit
and then choose which seller in the group to visit according to a probability
distribution over that group. Let mg be the probability that a buyer visits a
seller in group g and let σg,i denote the probability that a buyer visits seller
i who is a member of group g, given that the buyer has chosen to visit a
seller in group g.N o t et h a t
P
i∈g σg,i =1a n dt h a t
PG
g=1 mg =1 .
Within any given group g, in a mixed strategy equilibrium where all
sellers are visited with strictly positive probability, the expected payoﬀ to a
buyer from visiting any seller must the same. Since a buyer gets ug if alone
at a seller in group g and 0 otherwise, we must have
(1 − σg,i)
mgM−1 ug =( 1− σg,j)
mgM−1 ug for all i,j ∈ g, i 6= j.
This implies that σg,i = σg,j = σg for all i,j ∈ g.S i n c e
P
i∈g σg =1 ,w e
have σg =1 /Ng.
Now let us work out the probability distribution of buyers over sellers
in a given group g. First, the probability that some subset of buyers of size
k ≤ M all choose to visit group g is given by mk
g (1 − mg)
M−k. Then, given
that all members of the subset of size k visit group g, the probability that
exactly x of them visits a given seller is given by a binomial distribution




g (1 − σg)
k−x .
To ﬁnd the probability that x ≥ 0 buyers visit a particular seller, we need to
consider all possible subsets of buyers. For each k,t h e r ea r eM!/(k!(M − k)!)
subsets of size k. Summing over all possible k,w et h u sg e tt h ep r o b a b i l i t y





















28For auctions, we will be most interested in the probabilities that x =0 ,
x =1 ,a n dx>1. Let us deﬁne φg ≡ mgM/Ng,t h a ti s ,φg is the ratio
of buyers to sellers in the submarket consisting of sellers in group g.T h u s ,
M = φgNg/mg for all g, and recalling that σg =1 /Ng, equation (13) gives
the probability distribution of buyers over sellers as shown in table 3.
For readers who are unfamiliar with our matching technology, we now
cover the basic results relevant for this paper. For further details, the reader
is referred to Julien, Kennes and King (2000).




























Table 3: Probability distribution of buyers over sellers.
In this paper, for simplicity, we will work exclusively in the ‘large market’
case. To ﬁnd the limiting probability distribution of buyers over sellers in
a given group g we take the limits of the above probabilities as Ng →∞
while holding the group g buyer-seller ratio, φg, constant. This gives the
probability distribution of buyers over sellers shown in table 4.
#B u y e r s Probability
0 e−φg
1 φge−φg
> 1 1 − e−φg − φge−φg
Table 4: Probability distribution of buyers over sellers in a large market.
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